Active cognitive control of working memory is central in most human memory models, but behavioral evidence for such control in nonhuman primates is absent and neurophysiological evidence, while suggestive, is indirect. We present behavioral evidence that monkey memory for familiar images is under active cognitive control. Concurrent cognitive demands during the memory delay impaired matching-to-sample performance for familiar images in a demand-dependent manner, indicating that maintaining these images in memory taxed limited cognitive resources. Performance with unfamiliar images was unaffected, dissociating active from passive memory processes. Active cognitive control of memory in monkeys demonstrates that language is unnecessary for active memory maintenance.
Introduction
Human working memory can be compared to the display on an airport X-ray machine. Only a few bags can be viewed simultaneously and images of new baggage displace older images unless an operator exerts active control to freeze or manipulate the current view. Current models of human working memory differ in many aspects, but agree that the defining characteristic of working memory is active cognitive control (e.g., Baddeley, 2003; Cowan, 2008) . Information is rapidly lost unless actively maintained, such as by verbal rehearsal in a ''phonological loop' ' (Baddeley, 2003) . Because maintenance by top-down cognitive control consumes limited resources, cognitive operations that compete for these resources cause forgetting in a demand-dependent manner. For example, the comparatively difficult task of deciding whether two abstract shapes are identical impairs memory performance more than does passively viewing the same shapes (Logie, 1986) . Adding numbers impairs memory performance more than passively viewing numbers (Phillips & Christie, 1977) . Cognitive control over working memory is likely a major factor in general intelligence (Unsworth & Engle, 2007) , and may account for many cognitive differences between humans and nonhumans (Wynn & Coolidge, 2004) . Thus, cognitive control is a critical and defining feature of human working memory.
Researchers have made substantial progress characterizing the capacity (Elmore et al., 2011; Heyselaar, Johnston, & Pare, 2011) and neural substrates (Constantinidis, Franowicz, & Goldman-Rakic, 2001; Fuster & Alexander, 1971; Heuer & Bachevalier, 2011; Miller, Erickson, & Desimone, 1996) of short-term memory in nonhuman primates. But it is unclear whether these studies characterize a cognitively-controlled system similar to human working memory (Washburn & Astur, 1998) . The definitions of working memory in humans and nonhumans often differ. In the human literature, definitions of working memory focus on cognitive control (Baddeley, 2003; Cowan, 2008) . In the nonhuman literature, working memory is often operationalized as memory relevant only to the current trial, as opposed to reference memory for the rules of the task (Shettleworth, 1998, chap. 6 ). Other criteria for identifying working memory can also lead to confusion. For example, working memory is not equivalent to short-term memory 0010-0277/$ -see front matter Ó 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2012.10.012
